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This chapter reviews the extent to which stakeholder theory has been applied to, and 
adopted within, the academic accounting literature. The influence of stakeholder 
theory on accounting is growing but lags behind other business disciplines. This is 
due to the prevailing dominance of the shareholder primacy paradigm and a lack of 
convergence between the epistemological structure and socio-cultural characteristics 
of accounting, with university and professional education lagging behind 
contemporary thinking. This chapter starts with a discussion of these factors to 
provide context. 
 
The academic field of accounting is vast, and spans various distinct, yet overlapping, 
fields. This review is based on three sub-disciplines: management accounting 
(internal control and decision-making), financial accounting (reporting to external 
stakeholders) and sustainability reporting. Finance, auditing and corporate 
governance are not included. The review is restricted to the 27 accounting journals 
identified as 3* or 4* in the ABS Journal Ranking List (2015) and the Journal of 
Management special issue (52:7) on accounting for stakeholder value. The review is 
organized by sub-discipline and structured around prevailing themes. 
 
Considering the widespread appeal of stakeholder theory there is surprisingly little 
application to accounting research. The majority of research identified focused on 
two applications of stakeholder theory: i) as an explanation for reporting content of 
financial statements or sustainability reporting; ii) as a means of widening the  remit 
of the accounting function beyond shareholder primacy. For the majority of papers 
reviewed, however, the research is framed within stakeholder terminology and 
discourse but does not adhere to the tenets of stakeholder theory. Conclusions 
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suggest that there exists a strong opportunity to advance accounting through more 
novel, and more in-depth, applications of stakeholder theory. Accounting directly 
impacts stakeholders through the manner in which claims are recognized, recorded 
and prioritized. Influencing accounting to report on ways that are more relevant to 
stakeholders presents a clear opportunity for mainstreaming stakeholder theory and 
for enhancing the usefulness of the accounting function. 
 
The Socio-Cultural Characteristics of Accounting 
 
Accounting is a cultural artefact which serves an important social welfare function in 
wealth distribution. Perry and Nölke (2006: 560) argued that ‘Accounting impacts the 
lives of everyone in society, even (or perhaps especially) those who know very little 
about the subject and have never set eyes on a financial statement’. Accounting 
policy choice has economic consequences as accounting numbers determine, to 
varying extents, the price paid for goods by consumers, wage rises, bonuses and 
investments in staff, corporate taxation contributions to society, shareholder returns 
and pension actuary rates. The impact of accounting choice can be widespread. For 
example, fair value accounting (FAS157), enacted in 2006 by FASB in the USA 
which updated asset and liability values for banks, was highlighted by Laux and Leuz 
(2009) as a key determinant in the 2008 financial crisis. 
 
Anglo-American accounting is predominantly self-regulated by the accountancy 
profession. Standard setting bodies retain independence but are subject to 
significant political pressure from the vested interests inherent. The corporate and 
investor voice are the dominant pressures, as shareholders have historically 
provided the prevailing source of corporate finance. This influences the nature of 
standards issued and the objective of reporting which is skewed towards meeting the 
needs of ‘investors, lenders and other creditors in making decisions about providing 
resources to the entity’ (IASB, 2010:OB2). The needs of other stakeholders are 
either ignored or assumed to be included within this objective. This extends to 
sustainability reporting, despite the perception of this information being aimed at a 
wider audience, as evident in the Integrated Reporting Framework and the 
Sustainability Accounting Standards Board framework which focus on ‘providers of 
financial capital’ and ‘investors’ respectively (Ringham and Miles, 2018). 
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Hines (1988) advocated that the social influence of accounting is so strong that 
accountants ‘create reality’ (of what is accepted as valuable in business) by 
constructing the reality of what is recognized, measured and accounted for. For 
financial accounting this is restricted to those items in which a monetary value can  
be assessed with a reasonable degree of certainty. The boundary of reporting is 
based on ownership, control and significant influence within the definition of the legal 
entity. This determines what is, and, is not considered to be part of the organization 
and therefore what activities are reasonable to expect an organization to report on. 
This limits reporting to significant direct impacts of operations over which the 
organization has control (including subsidiaries), but excludes medium and long-term 
indirect impacts on ecosystems and society which may be of interest to a wider 
stakeholder audience. To exacerbate this issue Archel, Fernández, and Larrinaga 
(2008) argued that the financial reporting boundary is generally adopted within 
sustainability reporting. Alternative forms of investment, such as social, 
environmental or human capital are ignored, together with any return on capital 
derived, or associated distribution of value. This is considered poor strategic 
management (Freeman, Harrison, Wicks, Parmar and de Colle, 2010) and leads 
inequity in the distribution of value. 
 
Despite dramatic changes in the business world and ‘a barrage of business 
scandals’ leading to ‘a crisis of legitimacy’ for the accounting profession (Fisher, 
Swanson and Schmidt, 2007), accounting education has not progressed (Albrecht 
and Sack, 2000). Moral development is considered to be poor for both accounting 
students (Gray, Bebbinton and McPhail, 1994) and professional accountants 
(Armstrong, 1987). Many accounting firms have experienced detrimental 
consequences for their involvement in accounting frauds, the most high profile being 
the collapse of Arthur Andersen LLP in 2001 following the fraudulent handing of the 
Enron audit. Whilst the fall out of scandals and corporate collapses have damaging 
financial impacts on shareholders it is often the wider group of stakeholders that are 
most seriously affected, both at the individual (psychologically, socially and 
financially) and societal levels (increased unemployment and social benefits bill). 
 
Albrecht and Sack (2000) suggested that there is a greater need to take account of 
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the interests of different stakeholders across academic and professional accounting 
education. The solution to date has not, however, emerged.  Accounting bodies  
have a long history of accrediting higher education programmes whereby the syllabi 
is tailored to the syllabi of professional exams in exchange for offering professional 
exam exemptions to students. This affords the accounting bodies a substantial 
amount of power over shaping module content, which is significantly more 
pronounced compared to other disciplines. Furthermore, the extent to which the 
syllabi of the major accounting bodies embrace the stakeholder approach is weak, 
reflecting the dominant political pressures. This is, consequently, reflected 
throughout many degree programmes. 
 
The Epistemological Origins of Accounting 
Accounting is a sub-discipline of economics with the origins of its epistemological 
elements traced to the neo-classical economic framework. Historically accounting 
was created to record the financial aspects of organizations, but within the Anglo- 
American system soon developed into a corporate monitoring mechanism to protect 
capital providers against managerial self-interest, abuse and fraud. Accounting also 
serves as a bonding mechanism designed to increase goal congruence through the 
construction of contracts tied to accounting ratios. For example, corporate debt 
covenants tied to leverage levels and managerial bonuses and share plans 
determined by profit, earnings per share or total shareholder return. 
 
Traditional Anglo-American accounting theory reflects corporate law and is based on 
the theory of property rights and the maximization of shareholder wealth, presumed 
to be synonymous with the maximization of the value of the firm (Clarke, 2014).  
Little consideration is given to stakeholder interests beyond their impact on 
shareholder wealth or to elements (assets, liabilities, capital, revenues and 
expenses) that cannot be measured in monetary terms. This contrasts sharply with, 
for example, accounting in Finland which is seen as a means of providing  
information to satisfy the needs of a wide range of stakeholders (Näsi and Näsi, 
1996). The work of Rhenman has heavily influenced Finnish university education in 
accounting, which draws on the capital circulation and stakeholder models and 
incorporates social, environmental, public sector and not-for-profit disclosure as part 
of the mainstream accounting function. 
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Anglo-American accounting research has focused on the development of 
shareholder-centric models resulting from the intricate power relations that enshrine 
the importance of shareholders over other groups in society. ‘The theoretical 
underpinnings of the subject are restricted to only one ‘subset’ of ethical reasoning: 
financial utilitarianism….which is, in a sense, ‘indoctrination’’ (Ferguson, Collison, 
Power and Stevenson, 2005: 24). Parker (2007) argued that the historic influences 
from economics and finance-based positivism has led to accounting research being 
largely uncritical of the role of accounting in i) accepting the demands of the financial 
markets; ii) questioning the need to engage in reform via addressing major policy 
questions, and; iii) reporting for a broader range of stakeholders. Cooper and Owen 
(2007) called for legal reform towards a pluralistic form of governance to remove the 
one-dimensional power afforded to shareholders. Further lobbying of the profession 
is also warranted. Hawley (1991) argued that if shareholder wealth maximisation is 
continually prioritised as the superordinate goal, accounting academics are 
abdicating their responsibility to encourage corporate managers to recognize and 
deal with stakeholder inclusiveness effectively. 
 
Whilst shareholder primacy remains the predominant paradigm there has been 
various attempts in accounting research that have questioned this, and it is this 
subject that the discussion now turns. Partial reviews of the application of 
stakeholder theory to accounting exist (e.g. Brown and Jones, 2015; Freeman et al., 
2010; Roberts and Mahoney, 2004) but there is further scope for a comprehensive, 





Considering the widespread appeal of stakeholder theory there is surprisingly little 
research that has focused on a stakeholder theory approach to financial accounting. 
The majority of research within this stream relates to the exploration of stakeholder 
influence on financial disclosure and stakeholder information needs. There is also 
some exploratory research on stakeholder-oriented accounting systems. These will 






i) Stakeholder Influence on Accounting Information 
 
Accounting disclosure is determined in the first instance by regulators, such as 
standard setters and, in the second instance by corporate management. Anglo- 
American accounting studies recognise that standard setting is a mixed power 
system with stakeholders viewed as external social and political forces which 
pressurize standard setters and organizations to select accounting policies that 
satisfy their interests (Kwok and Sharp, 2005). This was illustrated by Nobes (1991): 
Upward force for tighter regulation, stemming from government, international 
influences, the profession and the media, are countered by demonstrable downward 
pressures for flexible standards from corporations. 
 
Stakeholder theory has been used as a framework to explain corporate earnings 
management, particularly with respect to earnings quality (the selection of more 
conservative accounting policy choices) and the timing of earnings announcement 
under management discretion. Thomson (1993) provided an early example through 
an analysis of stakeholder power during the pre- and post-privatization of the UK 
electricity industry. Pre-privatization focus of primary stakeholder groups 
(government, consumers, competitors) on rates of return incentivized management 
to minimize profits to avoid price-capping, whereas post-privatization profit- 
maximizing accounting choices were selected, as management were incentivized by 
newly constructed bonus and share option contracts to align their interests with  
those of the recently created shareholders. In a similar vein, Bowen, DuCharme and 
Shores (1995) found that implicit claims between an organization and its customers, 
suppliers, employees and short-term creditors act as incentives for management to 
use long-run income-increasing accounting choices in relation to depreciation and 
inventory. The use of a socio-economic perspective to evaluate accounting policy 
choice, as explored in such studies, provides a richer, more inclusive explanation of 
behaviour than reference to economic theories alone (Mangos and Lewis, 1995). 
 
Scott, McKinnon and Harrison (2003) examined the historical assessment (1857– 
1975) of stakeholder influence on the ‘cash-based versus accruals’ accounting 
choice at two Australian hospitals. Stakeholder influence was found to be a 
7  
determinant of accounting choice if stakeholders possessed power to exert influence 
and an incentive to exercise that power. Earnings management practices were  
found to differ between stakeholder-oriented countries and shareholder-orientated 
countries, with individuals from the former being less tolerant of earnings 
management due to the perceived impact on multiple stakeholder groups (Geiger 
and van der Laan Smith, 2010). 
Mattingly, Harrast and Olsen (2009) argued that stakeholder management is an 
effective process for governing organizations as it is associated with higher levels of 
accountability and higher earnings quality. Their findings clearly indicated that 
companies with more effective stakeholder management followed more conservative 
accounting choices and had more transparent financial disclosure, thereby meeting a 
wider range of stakeholders’ needs. Likewise, Hui, Klasa and Yeung (2012) 
illustrated that suppliers and customers with a bargaining advantage influence the 
selection of more conservative accounting policies. Such stakeholders bear 
significant downside risks if an organization fails but gain little from strong corporate 
performance. 
 
A ‘stakeholder hypothesis’ was developed by Bowen, Johnson, Shevlin and Shores 
(1992) to explain how organizations may benefit from timing the earnings 
announcement. The conceptualization of stakeholder theory was taken from the 
accounting and finance literature (citing Cornell and Shapiro, 1987). They argued 
that managers have an incentive to minimize the adverse reaction of stakeholders to 
bad news by delaying related earnings announcements. Building on this Burgstahler 
and Dichev (1997) argued that firms with higher earnings face lower transaction 
costs: consumers will pay a premium for assurance that warranties will be honoured, 
and suppliers/lenders offer better terms if repayment is more certain. They reasoned 
that implicit claims act as incentives for management to select accounting choices 
that maximise profits/minimise losses. 
 
Drawing on the ‘proactive-accommodative-defensive-reaction’ organizational 
strategy model and the life-cycle model (citing Jawahar and Mclaughlin, 2001), 
Camara, Chamorro and Moreno (2009) examined how the amount and type of 
financial information in the annual reports of the tobacco industry varied over the 
period 1887-1986 depending on the interests and power of key stakeholder (the 
State, employees and society). One area where stakeholder theory is repeatedly 
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used (in conjunction with legitimacy theory and agency theory) is within the voluntary 
disclosure of intellectual capital (see for example Alcaniz, Gomez-Bezares and 
Roslender, 2011; Castilla-Polo and Gallardo-Vázquez, 2016; Leuz and Verrecchia, 
2000, and; Yongvanich and Guthrie, 2005). Disclosure is dealt with within traditional 
balance sheet measures but can be supported by non-financial metrics and 
narrative, as, for example, developed in the Danish Intellectual Capital Statement 
(Nielsen, Roslender and Schaper, 2017). Beattie and Thomson (2007) and Beattie 
and Smith (2012) offered a managerial stakeholder perspective (disclosure driven by 
demands of primary stakeholders) and ethical stakeholder theory perspective 
(responsibility-driven disclosure) to explain motives for voluntary disclosure. They 
concluded that whilst the needs of financial market participants were paramount, the 
media and consumers were influential in disclosure decisions, especially disclosures 
that aimed to avoid scrutiny from stakeholder groups. 
 
ii) Accounting Information Needs of Stakeholders 
The objective of financial reporting, closely associated with user information needs, 
has been heavily contested by the accounting profession. Two objectives have 
dominated this debate: economic decision-making (aligned to shareholder primacy) 
and stewardship (more aligned to stakeholder theory). Early regulation (e.g. US 
Securities Act, 1933; US Securities Exchange Act, 1934; UK Corporate Report, 
1975) mandated the provision of reports for stewardship in the first instance and 
economic decision-usefulness information as a secondary objective. The current 
international conceptual framework (IASB, 2010) has regressed. Stewardship has 
been replaced by economic decision-making, thereby reinforcing the shareholder 
primacy paradigm (Harrison and van der Laan Smith, 2015). 
 
There is widespread criticism of the nature of financial reporting for reinforcing 
shareholder primacy and failing to meet stakeholder needs. Murphy, O’Connell and 
Ó hÓgartaigh (2013), for example, contended that stewardship is central to the ‘living 
law’ of accounting and is fundamental to encouraging corporate decision-makers to 
broaden their responsibilities. Barsky, Hussein and Jablonsky (1999) also called for 
richer disclosure to encompass a societal balanced score card approach. A ‘wheel  
of stakeholder interests’ was presented and stakeholder theory was discussed (citing 
Woodward et al., 1996 and Langtry, 1994). They argued that financial reporting 
9  
practices contributed to the selection of a poor downsizing strategy at United 
Technologies Corporation that favoured shareholders over other stakeholder groups. 
 
A stewardship approach to reporting will result in greater levels of disclosure as 
transparency   is   fundamental   in   discharging   stewardship.  This   is   particularly 
important for public sector reporting and several papers have explored this area from 
a stakeholder theory perspective. Goddard and Powell (1994) criticised the 
usefulness of public sector accounting systems in improving services due a 
misalignment between the shareholder wealth creation model followed in the 
reporting of public goods (determined by financial and legal probity) and lack of 
consideration of the plurality of stakeholder claims, concerns, issues, values and 
needs. Their ‘naturalistic stakeholder evaluation’ concluded that greater levels of 
stakeholder consultation were needed to understand how stakeholders use 
accounting information. This sentiment was echoed by Ellwood (2009) and Tooley, 
Hooks and Basman (2010). Ellwood (2009) applied the ladder of stakeholder 
engagement (Friedman and Miles, 2006) to analyse public healthcare in the UK. 
Tooley et al., (2010) highlighted the need to balance the multiple interests of 
stakeholders. They observed differences between the perceptions of internal and 
external stakeholders on the relative importance of disclosure items in the public 
sector reports. 
 
The stakeholder salience model (Mitchell, Agle and Wood, 1997) has also been 
applied to explore financial reporting user needs (e.g. Kamal, Brown, Sivabalan and 
Sundin, 2015). Specific applications included analysis of the response of the 
accounting profession to a crisis of credibility following an embezzlement scandal in 
New Zealand (Baskerville-Morley, 2004) and to assess public perception of profits 
during a period when the social reputation of the Canadian banking industry was 
sullied (Breton and Côté, 2006). 
 
iii. Alternative financial reporting systems 
Current financial reporting systems are considered deficient with regards to 
stakeholder inclusiveness (Mitchell, Van Buren, Greenwood and Freeman, 2015). 
This impedes the adoption of stakeholder theory within management practice and 
has led to calls for the reconceptualization of the accounting function. A special  
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issue of the Journal of Management Studies, dedicated to accounting for stakeholder 
value, addresses such concerns. Harrison and van der Laan Smith (2015) criticized 
the approach adopted by standard setters, calling for a reversal of the narrowing of 
the accounting function to widen the objectives towards accountability and 
stewardship. Brown and Dillard (2015) proposed a governance-focused solution that 
advocated a move beyond the managerial ethos to reflect a more pluralistic dialogue 
within accounting. For the remaining contributors the solution recommended was 
less radical. Hall, Millo and Barman (2015) supported the calculation of a  
stakeholder orientated social return on investment whilst both Crane, Graham and 
Himick (2015) and Andon, Baxter and Chua (2015) proposed adaptation of the 
current system. Crane et al. (2015) argued that pension accounting already provides 
metrics needed to co-ordinate stakeholder claims, through the accommodation of the 
time, security and priority aspects of the claims of pension beneficiaries. Shaoul 
(1998) provided a much earlier illustration of how financial reports can be used to 
assess the distribution of value to consumers, employees, industry and the public. 
The guest editors (Mitchell, Van Buren, Greenwood and Freeman, 2015) detailed a 
pragmatic stakeholder value creation accounting model that required a conscious 
shift away from the organization-centric entity concept of financial reporting to a 
proprietary concept model to capture value creation and risk sharing through the 
recording of exchange activities. They acknowledged that their ideas represented a 
sketch of a complex process, calling for further research in this emerging area. 
 
In summary the financial accounting research stream has acknowledged that 
stakeholder theory provides a richer, more inclusive explanation of behaviour 
compared to economic theories in examining stakeholders influence on standard 
setting, earnings management and voluntary disclosure. Stakeholder theory  
provides convincing explanations of management incentives to manage stakeholder 
pressure, to minimise information asymmetry, decrease transaction costs, reduce 
unwanted scrutiny from stakeholders and, to legitimise actions following reputation 
breaches. Research indicates that the adoption of a  strategic  stakeholder 
orientation results in greater levels of accountability, higher earnings quality, higher 
levels of voluntary disclosure and the adoption of more conservative accounting 
policies. The resulting increase in predictability and reliability of earnings has 
palpable societal benefits for stakeholders. 
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There remains, however, significant scope to explore financial reporting from a 
stakeholder theory perspective. Relatively little is known about how stakeholders 
influence accounting disclosure, particularly outside of the public sector. Whilst most 
papers within this research stream view the organization as a nexus of stakeholder 
contracts, stakeholder models are rarely adopted or tested, offering potential 
avenues for future research. Opportunities also exist to develop alternative financial 
accounting systems, along the lines of Mitchell et al., (2015), which aim to question 
the fundamental structure of existing financial reporting provision.  Further research 
is thereby required to make stronger theoretical connections between stakeholder 
inclusiveness and the reporting function. 
 
Management Accounting 
Studies that examine the influence of stakeholder theory in management accounting 
are focused in the area of control and performance management. Kaplan  and 
Norton (2001) are very clear that the balanced score card (BSC) is not a stakeholder 
scorecard aligned to corporate strategy. They claimed that a focus on stakeholder 
interests fails to reflect the causal relations between strategic areas and that the 
‘balance’ relates to the balancing of outcomes, not stakeholder interests. 
Nevertheless there have been a number of articles that have evaluated the BSC 
from a stakeholder theory approach. Sundin, Granlund and Brown  (2010) 
questioned Kaplan and Norton’s assertion that stakeholder and strategy scorecards 
are mutually exclusive in a capitalist system. The BSC was revised to a ‘balancing 
scorecard’ which started with a systematic identification of multiple stakeholders 
interests before implementing a traditional BSC analysis of the perceived cause-and- 
effect relationships and trade-offs between objectives and measures. The  
challenges that a stakeholder theory approach raises for resource allocation, 
performance measurement and achieving an equitable balance of interests were 
acknowledged by Sundin et al. (2010) but their conclusions clearly supported a focus 
on the balancing process to achieve procedural justice. 
 
Stakeholder analysis was also considered beneficial in understanding the dynamic 
influences of the external and internal environments on the formulation of objectives 
and strategy in a study by Li and Tang (2009). They provided empirical support for 
Jensen’s (2001) enlightened stakeholder theory with respect to the application of a 
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BSC. Axa and Bjørnenak (2005) found that Swedish corporations clearly 
implemented the BSC in a stakeholder orientation manner that aligned with the 
Swedish stakeholder capitalism model. This form of capitalism recognises implicit 
long-term bonds with stakeholders and is based on a system of mutual trust and 
cooperation. 
 
The influence of stakeholder theory on management control research was not 
evident until the publication of Norris and O’Dwyer (2004). Stakeholders are 
increasingly concerned with how corporate social and environmental issues are 
measured, monitored and reported suggesting the need for management to consider 
and weigh stakeholders’ concerns when selecting key performance indicators (KPIs) 
(Dillard and Roslender, 2011). Combining stakeholder theory with resource 
dependency theory, Länsiluoto, Järvenpää and Krumwiede (2013) found that buy-in 
was more achievable if goal congruence between stakeholders and resource 
providers was achieved in setting stakeholder objectives. This requires the explicit 
identification of stakeholder expectations and the subsequent translation of these 
expectations into specific accounting performance indicators.  They found evidence 
of stakeholder influence in the selection of KPIs. This reflected the findings from 
Brignall and Ballantine (2004): stakeholders negotiate proposals for change and use 
power and conflict to influence managerial choice of performance measures. 
 
Durden (2008) presented case evidence to demonstrate that a management control 
system that explicitly considered stakeholder goals would clearly differentiate 
management’s efforts to operate in a socially responsible manner from public 
relations exercises. Stakeholder influence on the selection of environmental KPIs 
was also investigated by Rodrigue, Magnan and Boulianne (2013). Stakeholder 
influence ranged from i) mediated influence on environmental strategy; ii) indirect 
influence from explicit stakeholder pressures on environmental KPIs selection; iii) 
shared influence arising from a common mind-set for environmental improvement, 
and; iv) environmental benchmarking influence, stemming from a comparison of 
performance by stakeholders to corporate peers. 
 
Other papers referred to the stakeholder model but did not base the analysis 
undertaken around it (e.g. Carlsson-Wall, Kraus and Messner, 2016). Merchant 
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(2006) explicitly rejected stakeholder theory as a framework but recognized that 
there could be some benefit if applied in a stakeholder-oriented not-for-profit setting. 
There is very limited research that investigates management accounting problems 





Within the sustainability reporting literature stakeholder theory is viewed as an 
overlapping, complimentary theory to legitimacy theory, set within a political 
economy framework (Gray et al., 1995). This overlap is frequently mentioned (e.g. 
Cormier, Magnan and Van Velthoven, 2004), supported (e.g. Thorne, Mahoney and 
Manetti, 2014) but rarely questioned (e.g. Tilling and Tilt, 2010). The predominant 
stakeholder perspective adopted is a strategic, instrumental theory approach. 
 
Gray, Dey, Owen, Evans and Zadek (1997) contended that stakeholder theory has 
only limited use as a lens for evaluating motives for disclosure, in so far as it helps to 
define which stakeholder groups management deem important, and in doing so 
identifies the boundaries of responsibility that organizations are willing to accept. 
They argued that the stakeholder perspective, being organization-centric, assumes 
that stakeholder interests are subsumed within the interest of management and 
therefore results in flawed, partial and biased reporting. This sentiment was echoed 
by Adams and Whelan (2009) and Parker (2005) who likened instrumental 
stakeholder theory to corporate enlightened self-interest driven by corporate  
strategic aims. 
 
Normative stakeholder theory, which is often referred to as the accountability variant 
of stakeholder theory within the accounting literature, is considered to have little 
descriptive power within a sustainability reporting context (Gray, Owen, and Adams, 
1996). The ongoing discussion in the stakeholder theory literature on the validity of 
the separation of ethics from actions that implies that instrumental (strategic) 
stakeholder theory can be applied separately from normative (ethical) stakeholder 
theory is largely ignored in the accounting literature as most researchers accept 
separation (Oriji, 2010). 
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There have, nevertheless, been some attempts at looking at wider accountability 
within a stakeholder perspective (e,g. O’Dwyer, Unerman and Bradley, 2005). 
Williams and Adams (2013) proposed an ‘intrinsic’ stakeholder approach, likened  
to that adopted in the AccountAbility AA1000 series and based on inclusivity, 
materiality, and responsiveness. This framework combined normative stakeholder 
theory with the theories of legitimacy, political economy, and the role of language 
and rhetoric in order to consider the moral responsibilities corporations have to 
employees, including the discharge of accountability evident in sustainability 
reporting. 
 
Most sustainability reporting research is organisation-centric and focused on 
economic stakeholders such suppliers, customers, lenders, competitors and 
investors (Mahadeo, Oogarah-Hanumana and Soobaroyen, 2011; Islam and 
Deegan, 2008). Few authors, such as Momin (2013), focused on a stakeholder- 
centric perspective, or a wider range of non-commercial stakeholders, despite the 
concern that it important for research to capture marginal voices.  Notable  
exceptions are Deegan and Blomquist (2006), O’Dwyer et al., (2005), O’Dwyer, 
Unerman and Hession (2004; 2005), Tilt (1994) and, Unerman and O’Dwyer (2006), 
who examined NGOs and, Grosser and Moon (2008) who explored gender equality 
reporting. 
 
Research can be categorized into two streams which are now discussed in turn: i) 
stakeholder theory as an explanation for voluntary disclosure, ii) stakeholder 
engagement in the sustainability reporting process. 
 
i) Voluntary Disclosure 
Stakeholder theory was first suggested as a framework for explaining voluntary 
disclosure by Ullmann (1985). The logic is straightforward: stakeholders demand 
sustainability information, and those with power to influence the corporation, derived 
from their control of critical resources, are more likely to have their demands met. 
Subsequent disclosure is the mechanism by which conformance to stakeholder 
expectations is demonstrated (Moneva and Llena, 2000). Ullmann (1985) cited the 
seminal contribution of Freeman’s (1984) generic stakeholder strategies and Pfeffer 
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and Salancik’s (1967) discussion on power and resource dependency. These 
theories were combined in the development of a three dimensional ‘contingency 
framework’ for implementing sustainability issues that considered stakeholder power, 
strategic posture and economic performance. This framework has empirical support 
in the accounting literature (e.g. Magness, 2006; Prado-Lorenzo, Gallego-Alvarez, 
and Garcia-Sanchez, 2009). Roberts (1992) found significant relationships between 
stakeholder power, strategic posture, economic performance and levels of disclosure 
across 130 major corporations, particularly with respect to government and creditor 
relationship management. More recently Herbohn, Walker, and Loo (2014) found 
sustainability reporting was significantly associated with media coverage, disposable 
resources and heightened exposure to environmental costs, thereby concluding that 
Ullmann’s framework remains relevant in explaining voluntary disclosure. 
 
Closely related to the issues of resource dependency and power is the notion of 
stakeholder salience. Researchers have provided empirical support for the 
proposition that the level and quality of sustainability reporting is positively correlated 
to stakeholder salience (see Dong, Burritt and Qan, 2014; Soobaroyen and Ntim, 
2013). Orij (2010) and Van der Laan Smith, Adhikari and Tondkar (2005) also found 
that power, legitimacy and urgency attributes of stakeholders are more pronounced 
in an international context and that stakeholder theory offers plausible explanations 
for variations in sustainability disclosure across countries. Van der Laan Smith et al. 
(2005) explored institutional and cultural differences between American and 
Norwegian/Danish organizations operating in the electric power generation industry. 
Their proposition that stakeholder theory provides a useful explanation for observed 
international differences was further tested by Van der Laan Smith, Adhikari, 
Tondkar and Andrews (2011) through the creation of a six point stakeholder scale to 
determine stakeholder/shareholder orientation. This tool captured issues such as 
perceptions of corporate social responsibility (CSR), the willingness to sacrifice 
return for improved CSR performance, and perceptions of the corporate objective 
function. They confirmed the earlier finding that stakeholder theory provided a 
proficient lens to evaluate and explain the systematic cross-national differences in 
investor responses to sustainability reporting. 
 
Pérez, López and García-De los Salmones (2017) also supported the explanatory 
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powers of the salience model in their empirical application to Spanish companies  
and recommended the establishment of regular stakeholder salience monitoring 
mechanisms as part of the reporting process. Brennan and Merkl-Davies (2014) 
adapted the salience model to incorporate the role of rhetoric skill in achieving 
conflict resolution in sustainability reporting. Rhetoric skill in harnessing stakeholder 
support from environmental activists, consumers, the general public and the media, 
was considered to be more effective in attaining power than direct control of financial 
resources. They tested their model on the interaction between Greenpeace and six 
sportswear/fashion firms over the elimination of hazardous chemicals within supply 
chains. Greenpeace’s success in this endeavour was attributed to its rhetoric skills  
in coalition-building and political action. 
 
Accounting research examining stakeholder influences on voluntary sustainability 
reporting has been fairly limited (e.g. Deegan and Blomquist, 2006 and Leisen, 
Hoepner, Patten and Figge, 2015). Elijido-Ten (2008) fully embraced stakeholder 
theory in an application of Frooman’s stakeholder influencing strategy framework to 
the issue of how stakeholder demands for sustainability reporting are attended to. 
The inconclusive results were considered to be a consequence of a lack of urgency 
in the focal event studied, leading to a subsequent re-examination in the context of 
an urgent issue which had potential significant negative stakeholder impacts (Elijido- 
Ten, Kloot and Clarkson, 2010). They concluded that stakeholder theory is useful in 
understanding both stakeholder and managerial behaviour with respect to 
sustainability reporting. 
 
Elijido-Ten (2011) also applied Freeman’s stakeholder strategy framework to 
voluntary sustainability reporting decisions. Her analysis juxtaposed the potential of a 
comprehensive range of stakeholders (consumers, media, government agencies, 
suppliers, shareholders, creditors, competitors, environmentalists and employees) to 
co-operate, against their potential to threaten organization process. She identified 
real and significant opportunities for some groups (government and consumers) to 
pressurize corporates into addressing environmental concerns and disclosing 
impact. 
 
Leisen et al. (2015) provided an extensive empirical study of greenhouse gas (GHG) 
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emissions disclosure using a stakeholder theory framework. They established 
alternative hypotheses to explain GHG emission disclosures of 431 companies. The 
first hypothesis suggested stakeholder driven disclosure, given the increased 
importance assigned to GHG emissions for climate change and associated 
stakeholder pressure to conform. The second hypothesis was based on disclosure 
as a legitimating strategy, given that GHG disclosure is largely voluntary and subject 
to managerial capture and manipulation.  They found support for both arguments  
and evidenced stakeholder influence on GHG emission reporting. 
 
ii) Stakeholder Engagement 
There are a multitude of papers which explore the role of stakeholder engagement in 
the sustainability reporting process (e.g. Deegan and Rankin, 1997; Tilt, 1994). 
Stakeholder engagement offers increased accountability to powerless and 
marginalized stakeholders and is linked to good governance, increased long-term 
value and reduced reputational and operational risks (Barone, Ranamagar and 
Solomon, 2013; Miles, Hammond and Friedman, 2002). Stakeholder engagement is 
a means of managing disclosure and it dominates the professional sustainability 
reporting arena such as the Global Reporting Initiative and AccountAbility AA1000 
series. 
 
Most contributors adopt stakeholder terminology but do not rigorously base their 
analysis on stakeholder theory (see Calabrese, Costa and Rosati, 2015). Boesso 
and Kumar (2009), Connolly, Hyndman and McConville (2013) and Manetti and 
Bellucci (2016) are all examples of papers that do place stakeholder theory explicitly 
within their analysis. Boesso and Kumar (2009) investigated the stakeholder 
prioritization and engagement process, associated with stakeholder salience 
(Mitchell et al., 1997) through an empirical assessment of US and Italian practice. 
Their findings highlighted the practical difficulties and limitations involved in meeting 
the needs of multiple stakeholder groups, despite managerial desires to address 
stakeholder demands. Despite astronomic increases in social media use, Manetti 
and Bellucci (2016) found that only a small minority of the 332 corporations 
examined actively used social media for stakeholder engagement and that the level 
of interaction was low. Social media can be effective in providing a voice to a wide 
range of stakeholders but Manetti and Bellucci (2016) warned that this may be 
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deceptive if the democratic process is not embedded. Connolly, et al. (2013) 
highlighted the problems of involving stakeholder groups meaningfully in a 
consultation process and, like Manetti and Bellucci (2016) highlighted the danger of 
quasi-consultation being undertaken to generate buy-in rather than to action 
influence in their study on the UK charity accounting standard setting process. They 
concluded that although funders were identified as legitimate primary stakeholders 
their influence was fairly negligible in determining content and disclosure. 
 
In summary the largest impact that stakeholder theory has had on accounting 
research has been in the area of sustainability reporting (Gray Kouhy and Lavers, 
1995). This research is predominantly organisation-centric.  There  remains 
significant scope to engage with stakeholder theory in a more robust way as the 
majority of research whilst framed within stakeholder terminology and discourse 




This review has outlined a growing body of accounting research that embraces 
stakeholder theory. There are two dominant areas in which stakeholder theory has 
been used as a frame of reference. Firstly, as an explanatory theory for accounting 
choice and voluntary disclosure the implicit claims of powerful stakeholders are 
considered. This enriches understanding by providing plausible explanations for 
anomalies that cannot be explained through traditional economic theories, such as 
agency theory. Stakeholder theory is also applied in exploring stakeholder influence, 
focusing on the identification of stakeholders needs and addressing how reporting 
can best fulfil these needs (or not). 
 
Significant future research opportunities still exist. Firstly researchers can learn from 
the application of stakeholder theory in other disciplines. Whilst there are some 
exceptions, for example the multiple applications of the salience model (Mitchell et 
al., 1997), there is generally a notable lack of acknowledgement of seminal 
stakeholder theory contributions originating from outside of the accounting literature. 
This indicates that further interdisciplinary research could provide useful insights into 
accounting problems and enhance understanding of management behaviour 
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regarding the accounting function. 
 
Secondly, more robust and explicit theoretical analysis is needed. The majority of 
accounting papers reviewed use stakeholder theory as a notional guide or a point of 
reference devoid of particular content. There is therefore significant scope develop 
stronger theoretical connections between stakeholder inclusiveness and accounting 
theory and practice. 
 
Thirdly, stakeholder theory is not a common frame of reference within the 
management accounting literature, which remains dominated by the corporate 
objective to maximize shareholder wealth. The shareholder-stakeholder orientation 
affects both the content of strategy and the strategic management accounting 
process which is central to financial decision-making in business. Nixon and Burns 
(2012) argued that in an environment of anti-business sentiment, corporate 
governance failures and the recent financial crisis, adherence to the classical 
strategic management accounting perspective, which assumes a stable and 
predictable environment, is questionable. A significant majority of the stakeholder 
theory informed management accounting papers are post-2003. Research indicates 
a growing awareness of the need to reassess traditional models of performance 
measurement, however, other management accounting theories and models, such 
as strategic management accounting techniques, capital investment appraisal and 
costing, would also benefit from being re-examined from a stakeholder theory 
perspective, highlighting an important area for future research. This is also an 
important area for management accounting education, which at best pays lip service 
to stakeholder theory, thereby reinforcing the shareholder primacy model in the 
minds of future managers. 
 
Fourthly, there is evidence of a call for broader narratives that engage accounting 
with a questioning of the status quo of shareholder primacy to widen accountability. 
The accounting profession has a significant role to play in advancing this issue,  
given the power and influence that it has over professional and academic 
qualifications as well as corporate disclosure. A clearer understanding  of 
stakeholder strategies deployed to influence accounting decision-makers (standard 
setters, the profession, academia, and corporate management) is needed in order to 
20  
change managerial mind-set and expectations placed on the profession through the 
delivery of reports that are more useful and relevant to managers and stakeholders. 
 
Finally, there is further scope for the critical school to develop novel ways of 
recording and prioritizing stakeholder claims that captures value creation and risk. 
This is a complex step-wise process which will require researchers to question: 1. 
the basic objectives, assumptions, concepts and principles and qualitative 
characteristics adopted in accounting; 2. the reporting boundary of what should, and 
should not be reported on which extends the beyond the principles of ownership and 
control to encompass impact and implicit claims; 3. recognition principles that are 
capable of including stakeholder claims and value exchange activities; 4. 
Measurement techniques and metrics that go beyond monetary representation of 
transactions to capture impacts and value creation. 5. Disclosure practices which 
enhances, not hinders stakeholder communication and engagement. 
 
This research agenda is multifaceted, challenging and thought  provoking. 
Accounting researchers are in a strong position to promote stakeholder theory in 
practice as well as being in a privileged position to develop better ways of 
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